Updated: Monday, March 18, 2024 at 1:30 p.m. PT.

In the United States, the fight for a federal Equal Rights Amendment has been a century in the making.

Meanwhile, state-level equivalents abound—some as comprehensive provisions of state constitutions that guarantee equal rights regardless of an individual’s gender, and others as provisions that prohibit gender-based discrimination in specific circumstances.

Following the U.S. Supreme Court’s ruling in Dobbs v. Jackson Women’s Health Organization, and given the federal courts’ growing hostility to many forms of civil rights protection, state courts and constitutions are becoming increasingly important. In the coming months and years, litigants may increasingly turn to state-level Equal Rights Amendments.

What follows is a summary of the protections afforded in the 50 states. (Find sources for each state here.)

States With ERAs

Alaska

“No person is to be denied the enjoyment of any civil or political right because of race, color, creed, sex, or national origin. The legislature shall implement this section.”

Alaska Const. art. I, § 3 (1972).

Background

The Alaska ERA passed on Aug. 22, 1972, with 43,281 votes in favor, 10,278 votes against.

Jurisprudence

In 1974, in Schreiner v. Fruit, the Alaska Supreme Court held that a married woman has a right to sue for loss of consortium due to a negligently inflicted injury to her husband. The court remarked, “Discrimination on basis of sex in granting only the husband the right to sue for lost consortium would also violate the Alaska Constitution.” 519 P.2d 462, 465 n.16 (Alaska 1974).

Alaska ratified the federal ERA on April 5, 1972.

California

“A person may not be disqualified from entering or pursuing a business, profession, vocation, or employment because of sex, race, creed, color, or national or ethnic origin.”

Cal. Const. art. I, § 8 (1974).

Background

The California provision passed on Nov. 5, 1974, with 3,567,443 votes in favor, 1,495,929 against. Members of the Constitutional Revision Commission originally proposed the amendment as part of a multi-year overhaul of the state constitution. Popular arguments in favor of the provision included strengthening individual rights and modernizing the constitution. Statewide papers covering this election highlighted low voter turnout and elections for public office; mentions of propositions are brief and the provision was not often discussed specifically. A 1996 proposition, also known as the California Civil Rights Initiative, was introduced with the intent to dismantle state affirmative action programs; it was approved by a vote of 54 percent to 46 percent.

Jurisprudence

In Rojo v. Kliger, the California Supreme Court found that sex discrimination in employment may support a claim of “tortious discharge” and violates public policy. Referring to California’s Constitution in reaching its decision, the court stated, “the provision unquestionably reflects a fundamental public policy against discrimination in employment—public or private—on account of sex.”  801 P.2d 373, 389 (Cal. 1990). This case has now been superseded by statute.

California ratified the federal ERA on Nov. 13, 1972.

Colorado

“Equality of rights under the law shall not be denied or abridged by the state of Colorado or any of its political subdivisions on account of sex.”

Colo. Const. art. II, § 29 (1972).

Background

The Colorado ERA passed on Nov. 7, 1972, with 531,415 votes in favor, 295,254 against. At the time, the General Assembly released three “popular arguments for” and three “popular arguments against” the proposed amendment. Arguments in favor included the importance of promoting equality and showing support for the national ERA. Arguments against included the statement that women’s rights were “already protected by the Fourteenth Amendment,” and that a state-level ERA would exclude women from protective labor laws.

Jurisprudence

In re Est. of Musso, the Colorado Court of Appeals held that the state’s Equal Rights Amendment prohibited the continuation and application of the presumption that the husband owned all household goods and property in a marriage. The court observed changing cultural attitudes toward gender,

“The presumption that husbands solely own all household goods is a creature of a different ’era’ in our society. It reflects an attitude that the law, as a mirror of the mores of society, should appropriately, expressly differentiate between married men and married women based entirely upon the issue of gender. … Thus, the presumption gives to married men the advantage in determination of ownership of household goods in relation to estate proceedings… To the extent that the presumption differentiates between men and women exclusively on the basis of gender, it is impermissible.” 932 P.2d 853, 855-56 (Colo. App. 1997).

In R. McG. v. J.W., the Supreme Court of Colorado held that a statute granting mothers the right to bring a paternity suit, but denying fathers the same right, violated the ERA. 615 P.2d 666 (Colo. 1980). The same court also found that its statutory rape statute did not violate the ERA even though it only applied to male offenders because it found that the ERA “does not prohibit differential treatment among the sexes when, as here, that treatment is reasonably and genuinely based on physical characteristics unique to just one sex.” People v. Salinas, 551 P.2d 703, 705 (Colo. 1976).

Colorado ratified the federal ERA on April 21, 1972.

Connecticut

“No person shall be denied the equal protection of the law nor be subjected to segregation or discrimination in the exercise or enjoyment of his or her civil or political rights because of religion, race, color, ancestry, national origin, sex.” or physical or mental disability.”

Conn. Const. art. I, § 20 (1974).

Background

The Connecticut ERA passed on Nov. 5, 1974, with 460,711 votes in favor, 135,427 against.

Jurisprudence

In Doe v. Maher, the Superior Court of Connecticut, Judicial District of New Haven found that the regulation that restricts the funding for medically necessary abortions except when the woman’s life is endangered violates Connecticut’s Equal Rights Amendment because it discriminates on the basis of sex. 515 A.2d 134 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1986). The court reasoned that since pregnancy is unique to those with uteruses, a funding classification based on pregnancy was inherently discriminatory.

“By adopting the ERA, Connecticut determined that the state should no longer be permitted to disadvantage women because of their sex including their reproductive capabilities. It is therefore clear, under the Connecticut ERA, that the regulation excepting medically necessary abortions from the Medicaid program discriminates against women, and, indeed, poor women.” 515 A.2d at 159.

The state’s highest court also held that a regulation that allowed a husband, but not a wife, deductions for dependent children was unconstitutional under the state ERA. Page v. Welfare Commissioner, 365 A.2d 1118, 1124 (Conn. 1976). And in Kerrigan v. Commissioner of Public Health, 289 Conn. 135 (Conn. 2008), the Connecticut Supreme Court held that the state’s ERA protected marriage equality.

Connecticut ratified the federal ERA on March 15, 1973.

Delaware

“Equality of rights under the law shall not be denied or abridged on account of race, color, national origin, or sex.”

Del.Const. art. I, § 21 (2019).

Background

The Delaware ERA is the most recent to be added to a state constitution as of August 2022. It passed the Delaware House with 35 votes in favor, 6 against; and then passed the state Senate with 16 votes in favor, 5 against.

Jurisprudence

There has been no litigation under this provision thus far.

Delaware ratified the federal ERA on March 23, 1972.

Florida

“All natural persons, female and male alike, are equal before the law and have inalienable rights, among which are the right to enjoy and defend life and liberty, to pursue happiness, to be rewarded for industry, and to acquire, possess and protect property. No person shall be deprived of any right because of race, religion, national origin, or physical disability.”

Fla. Const. art. I, § 2 (1998).

Background

The Florida ERA passed on Nov. 3, 1998, with 2,416,324 votes in favor, 1,230,683 against.

Jurisprudence

There has been no litigation under this provision thus far.

Florida has not ratified the federal ERA.

Hawaii

“Equality of rights under the law shall not be denied or abridged by the State on account of sex. The legislature shall have the power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the provisions of this section.”

Haw. Const. art. I, § 3 (1972).

Background

The Hawaii ERA passed on Nov. 7, 1972, with 251,822 votes in favor and 55,689 against.

Jurisprudence

Hawaii’s landmark marriage equality case, Baehr v. Lewin, relied on the state’s ERA. The Supreme Court of Hawaii held that because sex was a suspect classification under the ERA, the statute prohibiting same-sex marriage was subject to strict scrutiny which required a showing of compelling state interests and that the statute was “narrowly drawn to avoid unnecessary abridgements of applicant couples’ constitutional rights.” 852 P.2d 44, 82 (Haw. 1993). The case was preempted by a constitutional amendment which reinforced the state’s ban on same-sex marriage. 

In Holdman v. Olim, the Supreme Court of Hawaii found that a requirement that women wear a bra when visiting an all-male prison was constitutional under the state’s Equal Rights Amendment. The court concluded that the state had a compelling interest in this requirement, and the ERA is not so absolute as to not be subject to exceptions for physical characteristics that are unique only to one sex. 581 P.2d 1164, 1169 (Haw. 1978).

Similarly, in State v. Rivera, the Supreme Court of Hawaii also noted that a statutory classification, in this instance for rape, based on unique physical characteristics of men or women does not violate the ERA. The court reasoned, “A classification based on a physical characteristic unique to one sex is not an impermissive under- or over-inclusive classification because the differentiation is based on the unique presence of a physical characteristic in one sex and not based on an averaging of a trait or characteristic which exists in both sexes.” 612 P.2d 526, 530 (Haw. 1980).

Hawaii ratified the federal ERA on March 22, 1972.

Illinois

“The equal protection of the laws shall not be denied or abridged on account of sex by the State or its units of local government and school districts.”

Ill. Const. art. I, § 18 (1970).

Background

The Illinois ERA passed on Dec. 15, 1970, with 1,122,425 in favor, 838,168 against. Lawmakers proposed the Illinois ERA as part of a constitutional overhaul in the late 1960s; residents voted on the new constitution as a whole in the December 1970 special election.

Jurisprudence

In 1994, the Appellate Court of Illinois held in People v. Lann that litigants are prohibited from excluding jurors based on gender. The Court remarked that permitting gender discrimination would not only undermine the integrity of the judicial process and criminal justice system, but also harm both the defendant and the excluded jurors. 633 N.E.2d 938, 952 (Ill. 1994).

In Phelps v. Bing, the Supreme Court of Illinois held that a state marriage law that treated males and females differently regarding their age and right to obtain a marriage license was unconstitutional under the ERA. 316 N.E.2d 775 (Ill. 1974). Similarly, in People v. Ellis, the Supreme Court of Illinois found that differing ages between males and females for classifying defendants as juveniles was invalid under the ERA. 311 N.E.2d. 98 (Ill. 1974).

Illinois ratified the federal ERA on May 30, 2018.

Iowa

 “All men and women are, by nature, free and equal, and have certain inalienable rights — among which are those of enjoying and defending life and liberty, acquiring, possessing and protecting property, and pursuing and obtaining safety and happiness.”

Iowa Const. art. I, § 1 (1998).

Background

The Iowa ERA passed on Nov. 3, 1998, with 654,419 votes in favor, 128,589 against. The ERA originally appeared on Iowa voters’ ballots in 1992; the bill failed with 557,918 votes in favor and 604,839 against.

Jurisprudence

On June 17, 2022, in Planned Parenthood of the Heartland v. Kim Reynolds (No. 21–0856), the Iowa Supreme Court overruled earlier precedent finding that denying abortion rights amounts to sex discrimination under the state’s ERA. The Court also rejected other state constitutional grounds, previously recognized as protecting abortion rights.  

Iowa ratified the federal ERA on March 24, 1972.

Maryland

“Equality of rights under the law shall not be abridged or denied because of sex.”

Md. Dec. of R. art. 46 (1972).

Background

The Maryland ERA passed on Nov. 7, 1972. Digitized election result records are not presently available.

Jurisprudence

In Maryland, the state’s ERA has been used by the courts in a variety of areas. Several cases have established that men and women must be treated equally under the state’s ERA, particularly in domestic circumstances. In Coleman v. State, Maryland’s high court held that liability for nonsupport must be imposed on both wives and husbands. 377 A.2d 553 (Md. 1977). Similarly, in Tidler v. Tidler, the Court of Special Appeals held that women were equally responsible for counsel fees in divorce actions. 435 A.2d 489 (Md. 1981).

In Bell v. Bell, the same court held that the view of the husband as the dominant person in a marriage was invalid under the state ERA. 379 A.2d 419 (Md. 1977). In both Stern v. Stern, and Rand v. Rand, the Court of Special Appeals, and the Court of Appeals, respectively found that both parents were equally responsible for child support regardless of gender. 473 A.2d 56 (Md. 1984); 374 A.2d 900 (Md. 1977).

In 1980, in Kline v. Ansell, the Court of Appeals recognized that the common-law right to sue or be sued for criminal conversation being limited only to men was in violation of the state’s ERA. Since the law provided different benefits and burdens based solely on sex, the court abolished the law as unconstitutional. 414 A.2d 929, 933 (Md. 1980).

Moreover, the Maryland Court of Appeals held that a private men’s only country club could not receive preferential tax benefits as long as the club discriminated on the basis of sex. Burning Tree Club, Inc. v. Bainum, 501 A.2d 817 (Md. 1985).

Maryland ratified the federal ERA on May 26, 1972.

Massachusetts

“All people are born free and equal and have certain natural, essential and unalienable rights; among which may be reckoned the right of enjoying and defending their lives and liberties; that of acquiring, possessing and protecting property; in fine, that of seeking and obtaining their safety and happiness. Equality under the law shall not be denied or abridged because of sex, race, color, creed or national origin.”

Mass. Const. pt. 1, art. I (1976).

Background

The Massachusetts ERA passed on Nov. 2, 1976, with 1,445,066 votes in favor, 945,789 votes against.

Jurisprudence

In Massachusetts, the ERA has been used in myriad ways. In 1977, the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, Suffolk held that punishing female, but not male prostitutes, violated the ERA. Com. v. King, 372 N.E.2d 196 (Mass. 1977). In reaching this decision, the Court observed “that the people of Massachusetts view sex discrimination with the same vigorous disapproval as they view racial, ethnic, and religious discrimination.” 372 N.E.2d 196, 206. This case was superseded by statute §53A in 1983.

Also in 1977, the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts warned that a proposed bill that would prohibit women from participating in contact sports with men would be discriminatory and thus invalid under the ERA. Opinion of the Justices to the House of Rep. 371 N.E.2d 426 (Mass. 1977).

The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, Worcester extended inheritance rights to a plaintiff in Lowell v. Kowalski, finding that the discriminatory impact of a sex-based classification which results in children receiving different inheritances was unconstitutional. Furthermore, the court acknowledged the broader ramifications of such a decision, “The plaintiff in this case is asserting more than an adverse financial impact; she is litigating the issue of her status in the community… Such a ‘plaintiff’s interest is not simply economic. The plaintiff has a separate, identifiable interest in not being treated by her government as a second-class person.’” 405 N.E.2d 135, 139 (Mass. 1980) (citing Eskra v. Morton, 524 F.2d 9, 12-13 (7th Cir. 1975) (Stevens, J.)).

Massachusetts ratified the federal ERA on June 21, 1972.

Montana

“Individual dignity. The dignity of the human being is inviolable. No person shall be denied the equal protection of the laws. Neither the state nor any person, firm, corporation, or institution shall discriminate against any person in the exercise of his civil or political rights on account of race, color, sex, culture, social origin or condition, or political or religious ideas.”

Mont. Const. art. II, § 4 (1973).

Background

The Montana ERA passed on June 6, 1972, with 116,415 votes in favor of the proposed constitution, 113,883 against. The ERA was passed as part of a constitutional overhaul in 1971-1972. The Montana Legislature adopted a new, proposed constitution on March 22, 1972, before passing it along to voters in a special election. A sample ballot featured the full text of the proposed constitution; the proposed ERA was highlighted as a key change.

Jurisprudence

There has been no litigation under this provision thus far.

Montana ratified the federal ERA on Jan. 25, 1974.

New Hampshire

“All men have certain natural, essential, and inherent rights –among which are, the enjoying and defending life and liberty; acquiring, possessing, and protecting, property; and, in a word, of seeking and obtaining happiness. Equality of rights under the law shall not be denied or abridged by this state on account of race, creed, color, sex or national origin.”

N.H. Const. pt. I, art. 2 (1974).

Background

The New Hampshire ERA passed on Nov. 5, 1974, with 135,989 votes in favor, 65,421 votes against.

Jurisprudence

In State v. Lilley, the Supreme Court of New Hampshire held that a statute banning public nudity did not violate the ERA because it was rationally related to the purpose of upholding public interests and did not amount to discrimination by prohibiting female breast exposure, but not male. 204 A.3d 198 (N.H. 2019).

New Hampshire ratified the federal ERA on March 23, 1972.

New Mexico

“No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law; nor shall any person be denied equal protection of the laws. Equality of rights under law shall not be denied on account of the sex of any person.”

N.M. Const. art. II, § 18 (1973).

Background

The New Mexico ERA passed on Nov. 7, 1972, with155,633 votes in favor, 64,823 votes against. Afterwards, lawmakers realized multiple state laws would have to be changed to comply with the new amendment. Laws that required adjustment included those related to “labor, rape, support, gambling, mining, and the National Guard.”

Jurisprudence

In New Mexico Right to Choose/NARAL v. Johnson, the Supreme Court of New Mexico held that the state’s Medicaid program discriminated against women by restricting abortion funding. In doing so, the Court interpreted the state’s ERA to find that the state’s Medicaid program must fund medically necessary abortion because otherwise it applied a different standard of medical necessity to men and women with no compelling justification. In its opinion, the Court remarked, “‘since time immemorial, women’s biology and ability to bear children have been used as a basis for discrimination against them.’” 975 P.2d 841, 854 (N.M. 1998) (citing Doe v. Maher, 515 A.2d 134, 159 (Conn. 1986)).

New Mexico ratified the federal ERA on Feb. 28, 1973.

Oregon

“Equality of rights under the law shall not be denied or abridged by the state of Oregon or by any political subdivision in this state on account of sex.”

Or.Const. art. I, § 46(1) (2014).

Background

The Oregon ERA passed on Nov. 4, 2014, with 925,892 votes in favor, 514,907 votes against.

Jurisprudence

There has been no litigation under this provision thus far.

Oregon ratified the federal ERA on Feb. 8, 1973.

Pennsylvania

“Equality of rights under the law shall not be denied or abridged in the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania because of the sex of the individual.”

Pa. Const. art. I, § 28 (1971).

Background

The Pennsylvania ERA passed on May 18, 1971, with 783,441 votes in favor, 464,882 against. Prior to this election, Pennsylvania had just elected Milton Shapp, one of Pennsylvania’s most progressive governors at the time, who strongly urged voters to approve the amendment.

Jurisprudence

Pennsylvania has been a leader in using its ERA to strike down laws that perpetuate the unequal treatment: “The sex of citizens of this Commonwealth is no longer a permissible factor in the determination of their legal rights and legal responsibilities. The law will not impose different benefits or different burdens upon the members of a society based on the fact that they may be man or woman.” Henderson v. Henderson, 327 A.2d 60, 62 (1974).

Pennsylvania state courts have leveraged its ERA in domestic circumstances, in particular. See Di Florido v. Di Florido, 331 A.2d 174 (Pa. 1975) (abolishing presumption that husband is owner of household goods that are used and possessed by wife); Adoption of Walker, 360 A.2d 603 (Pa. 1976) (holding that the Adoption Act’s failure to require parental consent of both parents, even if unwed, violates the ERA); Henderson v. Henderson, 327 A.2d 60 (Pa. 1974) (decided under previous divorce code, striking down statute providing for counsel fees and expenses in divorce action for wife but not husband, which has now been superseded); Conway v. Dana, 318 A.2d 324 (Pa. 1974) (abolishing assumption that father must bear the principal burden of child support); Hopkins v. Blanco, 320 A.2d 139 (Pa. 1974) (holding that the ERA requires that both wife and husband should be permitted to recover for loss of consortium).

In Com v. Butler, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania struck down the Muncy Act mandating that no woman receives a minimum sentence as it treats men and women offenders differently despite the commission of the same crime. 328 A.2d 851, 859 (Pa. 1974).

The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania has also used the state ERA to find that the Pennsylvania Interscholastic Athletic Association must allow girls to compete in sports with boys. Commonwealth v. Pennsylvania Interscholastic Athletic ’Ass’n., 334 A.2d 839 (Pa. 1975):

“The notion that girls as a whole are weaker and thus more injury-prone, if they compete with boys, especially in contact sports, cannot justify the By-Law in light of the ERA. Nor can we consider the argument that boys are generally more skilled. The existence of certain characteristics to a greater degree in one sex does not justify classification by sex rather than by the particular characteristic. If any individual girl is too weak, injury-prone, or unskilled, she may, of course, be excluded from competition on that basis but she cannot be excluded solely because of her sex without regard to her relevant qualifications.” Id. at 873-74 (citations omitted).

The ERA has also been used less progressively. In Fischer v. Dep’t of Pub. Welfare, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that indigent women were not entitled to a publicly funded abortion, rejecting, among other things, a claim under the state ERA. 502 A.2d 114, 124 (Pa. 1985).

In 2008, in Dillon v. Homeowner’s Select, the Superior Court of Pennsylvania ruled that the ERA did not create a private right of action against an employer for gender-based discrimination. 957 A.2d 772 (Pa. 2008).

Pennsylvania ratified the federal ERA on Sept. 26, 1972.

Texas

“Equality under the law shall not be denied or abridged because of sex, race, color, creed, or national origin. This amendment is self-operative.”

Tex. Const. art. I, § 3(a) (1972).

Background

The Texas ERA passed on Nov. 7, 1972, with 2,156,536 votes in favor, 548,422 votes against.

Jurisprudence

In 1987, the Supreme Court of Texas held that the gender-based distinction in the state’s Family Code regarding parental rights of children born out of wedlock violated the state Equal Rights Amendment because the state’s interest in children’s welfare can be executed without discriminating based on sex. In Int. of McLean, 725 S.W.2d 696 (Tex. 1987). The Court underscored the ERA’s power in making its decision: “Even the loftiest goal does not justify sex-based discrimination in light of the clear constitutional prohibition.” Id. at 698.

In 2002, in Bell v. Low Income Women of Texas, the Supreme Court of Texas also held that restrictions on federal funding for abortion services did not violate the state ERA because the restrictions did not discriminate on the basis of sex and were rationally related to a legitimate government purpose. 95 S.W.3d 253, 255 (Tex. 2002).

Texas ratified the federal ERA on March 30, 1972.

Utah

“The rights of citizens of the State of Utah to vote and hold office shall not be denied or abridged on account of sex. Both male and female citizens of this State shall enjoy all civil, political and religious rights and privileges.”

Utah Constitution, Article IV, §1 (1896).

Background

The original Utah Constitution of 1896 contained an equality provision.

Jurisprudence

In July 2022, the provision undergirded the preliminary injunction issued in Planned Parenthood v. State of Utah, blocking the state’s trigger law from taking effect during the course of the litigation.

Utah has not ratified the national ERA.

Virginia

“That no person shall be deprived of his life, liberty, or property without due process of law; that the General Assembly shall not pass any law impairing the obligation of contracts; and that the right to be free from any governmental discrimination upon the basis of religious conviction, race, color, sex, or national origin shall not be abridged, except that the mere separation of the sexes shall not be considered discrimination.”

Va. Const. art. I, § 11 (1971).

Background

The Virginia ERA passed on Nov. 3, 1970, with 576,776 votes in favor, 226,219 against. ERA verbiage was not explicitly mentioned on the 1970 ballot. Instead, the ballot asked voters, “Shall the Constitution be generally amended and revised, as agreed to by the General Assembly at its 1969 and 1970 sessions…?”

Jurisprudence

The Supreme Court of Virginia held that doctrine obligating only a husband to pay for a wife’s necessaries without obligating the wife as well violated the state’s ERA. Schilling v. Bedford Cty. Memorial Hosp. 303 S.E.2d 905 (Va. 1983). The Court has applied intermediate scrutiny to interpret the state ERA, modeled on the federal constitution.

Virginia ratified the federal ERA on Jan. 27, 2020 (and became the 38th and final state needed under Article V requirements to ratify the ERA).

Washington

“Equality of rights and responsibility under the law shall not be denied or abridged on account of sex.”

Wash. Const. art. XXXI, § 1 (1972).

Background

The Washington ERA passed on Nov. 7, 1972, with 645,115 votes in favor, 641,746 votes against.

Jurisprudence

The Supreme Court of Washington held in Darrin v. Gould that a school district’s refusal to allow two girls to play on the high school football team solely on the basis of their gender was unconstitutional. 540 P.2d 882 (Wash. 1975). In making its decision, the Court remarked on the oppressive nature of discriminatory laws and corresponding barriers for women:

“Laws which disable women from full participation in the political, business and economic arenas are often characterized as ‘protective’ and beneficial. Those same laws applied to racial or ethnic minorities would readily be recognized as invidious and impermissible. The pedestal upon which women have been placed has all too often, upon closer inspection, been revealed as a cage.” Id. at 888 (citing Sailer Inn, Inc. v. Kirby, 5 Cal. 3d 1, 485 P.2d 529, 95 Cal. Rptr. 329 (1971)).

Washington ratified the federal ERA on March 22, 1973.

Wyoming

“In their inherent right to life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness, all members of the human race are equal.”

Wyo. Const. art. I, § 2 (1890).

“Since equality in the enjoyment of natural and civil rights is only made sure through political equality, the laws of this state affecting the political rights and privileges of its citizens shall be without distinction of race, color, sex, or any circumstance or condition whatsoever other than the individual incompetency or unworthiness duly ascertained by a court of competent jurisdiction.”

Wyo. Const. art. I, § 3 (1890).

“The rights of citizens of the state of Wyoming to vote and hold office shall not be denied or abridged on account of sex. Both male and female citizens of this state shall equally enjoy all civil, political and religious rights and privileges.”

Wyo. Const. art. VI, § 1 (1890).

Background

The Wyoming ERA was included as part of Wyoming’s 1890 original constitution.

Jurisprudence

In Coyne v. State ex rel. Thomas, the Supreme Court of Wyoming used the state’s ERA to find that husbands and wives do not constitute a single entity, and therefore spouses of teachers and cooks at the school are not precluded from serving as trustees of the school district by concerns of incompatibility of office. 595 P.2d 970, 974 (Wyo. 1979).

Wyoming ratified the federal ERA on April 22, 1972.

States With Limited Gender Equality Provisions

Arizona

“This state shall not grant preferential treatment to or discriminate against any individual or group on the basis of race, sex, color, ethnicity or national origin in the operation of public employment, public education or public contracting.”

Ariz. Const. art. II, § 36(A).

Background

The Arizona provision passed on Nov. 2, 2010, with 952,086 votes in favor and 647,713 against. Arizona is one of several states (Michigan and Nebraska among them) that proposed its provision as a means to curb affirmative action.

Jurisprudence

There has been no litigation under this provision thus far.

Arizona has not ratified the federal ERA.

Louisiana

“No person shall be denied the equal protection of the laws. No law shall discriminate against a person because of race or religious ideas, beliefs, or affiliations. No law shall arbitrarily, capriciously, or unreasonably discriminate against a person because of birth, age, sex, culture, physical condition, or political ideas or affiliations. Slavery and involuntary servitude are prohibited, except in the latter case as punishment for crime.”

La. Const. art. I, § 3 (1974).

Background

The Louisiana provision was adopted and added to the Louisiana Constitution at the Louisiana Constitutional Convention on Jan. 19, 1973. The provision was never presented to voters.

Jurisprudence

In 2004, the Louisiana Supreme Court in Albright v. S. Trace Country Club Of Shreveport, Inc., 2003-3413 (La. 7/6/04) held that a country club’s men-only dining policy which excluded female club members violates the state constitution.

Louisiana has not ratified the federal ERA.

Michigan

“The state shall not discriminate against, or grant preferential treatment to, any individual or group on the basis of race, sex, color, ethnicity, or national origin in the operation of public employment, public education, or public contracting.”

Mich. Const. art. I, § 26(2) (2006).

Background

The Michigan provision passed on Nov. 7, 2006, with 2,141,010 votes in favor, 1,555,691 against. Michigan is one of several states (Arizona and Nebraska among them) that proposed its provision as a means to curb affirmative action.

Jurisprudence

There has been no litigation under this provision thus far.

Michigan ratified the federal ERA on May 22, 1972.

Nebraska

“The state shall not discriminate against, or grant preferential treatment to, any individual or group on the basis of race, sex, color, ethnicity, or national origin in the operation of public employment, public education, or public contracting. … Nothing in this section prohibits bona fide qualifications based on sex that are reasonably necessary to the normal operation of public employment, public education, or public contracting.”

Neb. Const. art. I, § 30 (2008).

Background

The Nebraska provision passed on Nov. 4, 2008, with 404,766 votes in favor, 298,401 against. Nebraska is one of several states (Arizona and Michigan among them) that proposed its provision as a means to curb affirmative action. As a result, many organizations in Nebraska (particularly educational institutions) spoke out publicly to voice concerns about the amendment. Between 2020 and 2022, there have been several statewide campaigns to repeal it.

Jurisprudence

There has been no litigation under this provision thus far.

Nebraska ratified the federal ERA on March 29, 1972.

New Jersey

“Wherever in this Constitution the term ‘person,’ ‘persons,’ ‘people’ or any personal pronoun is used, the same shall be taken to include both sexes.”

N.J. Const. art. X, § 4 (1947).

Background

The New Jersey provision passed on Nov. 4, 1947, with 653,096 votes in favor, 184,632 against. Voters did not vote for the provision on its own, but rather for a new state constitution proposed by the New Jersey Constitutional Convention.

Jurisprudence

There has been no litigation under this provision thus far.

New Jersey ratified the federal ERA on April 17, 1972.

Rhode Island

“No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law, nor shall any person be denied equal protection of the laws. No otherwise qualified person shall, solely by reason of race, gender or handicap be subject to discrimination by the state, its agents or any person or entity doing business with the state. Nothing in this section shall be construed to grant or secure any right relating to abortion or the funding thereof.”

R.I. Const. art. I, § 2 (1986).

Background

The Rhode Island provision passed on Nov. 4, 1986, with 163,862 votes in favor, 76,238 votes against. The original text specified the amendment “should not be construed ‘to prohibit or authorize abortion.’” After weeks of debate and testimony submitted by anti-abortion activists, the convention struck down the original provision in October 1986; instead, members of the convention rewrote the amendment to specify “that no approval of state-sanctioned abortions was implied,” giving way to the language that currently exists in the Rhode Island constitution.

Jurisprudence

In 1992, in Kleczek v. Rhode Island Interscholastic League, Inc., the Supreme Court of Rhode Island made it clear in deciding that a male student could not participate on the girl’s field hockey team that Rhode Island had not adopted an ERA:

“It is clear to us that the delegates to our Constitutional Convention did not vote on an ERA and did not propose one to the people for ratification. Such a resolution was never reported out of committee. To argue that we have adopted what is in effect an ERA in article 1, section 2, is to argue a proposition that has no foundation in fact. We are of the opinion that the convention proposed, and the people ratified, an equal-protection clause and an antidiscrimination clause, that were intended to fill a void that had existed in our constitution up until that time.” 612 A.2d 734, 740 (R.I. 1992).

Rhode Island ratified the national ERA on April 14, 1972.

States With Active State ERA Ratification Efforts

Minnesota

The proposed amendment reads: “Equality under the law shall not be abridged or denied on account of gender.”

Background

In 2019, the proposed amendment passed in the Minnesota House of Representatives but did not advance through the state Senate. The House reintroduced the ERA in 2022.

Jurisprudence

Under the Minnesota Constitution, intermediate scrutiny applies to gender-based classifications. State on Behalf of Forslund v. Bronson, 305 N.W.2d 748 (1981).

Even without an explicit ERA, in Doe v. Minnesota (Minn. 2d Jud. Dist. No. 62-cv-19-3868), a district court on July 11, 2022, blocked abortion restrictions based on the state constitution’s liberty and equal protection provisions, holding that abortion is a fundamental right which gets the highest scrutiny.

Minnesota ratified the federal ERA on Feb. 8, 1973.

Maine

In 2019, Resolution LD433 was introduced in the Senate: “Proposing an Amendment to the Constitution of Maine to Explicitly Prohibit Discrimination Based on the Sex of an Individual.” 

Background

The Resolution was passed in the state Senate by two-thirds majority with bipartisan support. On Feb. 16, 2022, Maine’s House of Representatives voted on a resolution to amend the Maine Constitution to include a sex equality guarantee. The vote, 80-57 along party lines, fell short of the necessary two-thirds majority.

Jurisprudence

There has been no litigation under this provision thus far.

Maine ratified the federal ERA on Jan. 18, 1974.

Nevada

“Equality  of  rights  under  the  law  shall  not  be denied  or  abridged  by  this  State  or  any  of  its  political subdivisions  on  account  of  race,  color,  creed,  sex,  sexual orientation,  gender  identity  or  expression,  age,  disability, ancestry or national origin.”

Background

The Nevada ERA passed on Nov. 8, 2022, with 580,022 votes in favor, 409,228 votes against.  

Jurisprudence

There has been no litigation under this provision thus far.

Nevada ratified the federal ERA on March 22, 2017.

New York

The proposed amendment reads: “No person shall be denied the equal protection of the laws of this state or any subdivision thereof. No person shall, because of race, color, ethnicity, national origin, age, disability, creed (or), religion, or sex, including sexual orientation, gender identity, gender expression, pregnancy, pregnancy outcomes, and reproductive healthcare and autonomy, be subjected to any discrimination in [his or her] civil rights by any other person or by any firm, corporation, or institution, or by the state or any agency or subdivision of the state, pursuant to law.” (S.8797B/A.10468A)

Background

On July 1, 2022, the New York state legislature passed an inclusive ERA which guarantees, among others, reproductive rights including pregnancy outcomes and reproductive healthcare and autonomy.

The New York Equal Protection of Law Amendment is on the ballot for Nov. 5, 2024.

A “yes” vote would amend the Equal Protection Clause in the New York Constitution, prohibiting discrimination on the basis of “ethnicity, national origin, age, [and] disability,” as well as the person’s “sex, including sexual orientation, gender identity, gender expression, pregnancy, pregnancy outcomes, and reproductive healthcare and autonomy.”

Jurisprudence

There has been no litigation under this provision thus far.

New York ratified the federal ERA on May 18, 1972.

Vermont

“This proposal would amend the Constitution of the State of Vermont to specify that the government must not deny equal treatment and respect under the law on account of a person’s race, ethnicity, sex, disability, sexual orientation, gender identity, gender expression, or national origin. The Constitution is our founding legal document stating the overarching values of our society.”

Background

A new proposal in the Vermont Senate, Proposal 4, sponsored by 23 state senators, will amend existing language in Chapter 1 of the Vermont Constitution to say that “the government must not deny equal treatment and respect under the law on account of a person’s race, ethnicity, sex, disability, sexual orientation, gender identity, gender expression, or national origin.”

Jurisprudence

There has been no litigation under this provision thus far.

Vermont ratified the federal ERA on March 1, 1973.

States With no ERA

• Alabama
• Arkansas
• Georgia
• Idaho
• Indiana*
• Kansas
• Kentucky
• Missouri
• Mississippi
• North Carolina
• North Dakota
• Ohio
• Oklahoma
• South Carolina
• South Dakota
• Tennessee
• West Virginia
• Wisconsin

*Indiana’s general constitutional language—”The General Assembly shall not grant to any citizen, or class of citizens, privileges or immunities, which, upon the same terms, shall not equally belong to all citizens,” Article 1, §23 (2018)—has not been tested or challenged, but possibly includes limited sex equality protections. 

Editor’s note: This summary report was researched and prepared by Sadie Logerfo-Olsen (Fordham Law School) and Katie Hawkinson (Georgetown University) during their 2022 summer internship at the Brennan Center for Justice. Alicia Bannon, director of the Judiciary Program at the Brennan Center, and Jennifer Weiss-Wolf, executive director of the Birnbaum Women’s Leadership Network at NYU School of Law, conceptualized and supervised this project. Ting Ting Cheng, director of the ERA Project at Columbia Law School, provided invaluable contributions; she is currently developing model policy agendas for state executives to robustly implement state ERAs.

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